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Abstract 
There are more publics involved in science than one would imagine at first sight. 
In technoscientific conditions what counts as knowledge creation is not primarily 
the individual experimental achievement that gives coherence to scientific 
practice and separates science from its publics; rather, it is a form of dispersed 
experimentation in more than human worlds: distributed invention power. This 
form of labour involves intensive relationalities and transversal experimentation 
across different groups of people, other species and material environments. 
Distributed invention power is organised and regulated through the pervasive 
securitisation of technoscience: surveillance and control of technoscientific fields 
as well as financialisation of its activities and research outputs. The securitisation 
of science reorders the traditional split between the public sphere, the private 
sector and the commons. The folding of each one of these spheres into the other 
underlies a constant, often antagonistic, oscillation between big science and open 
science. What is constitutive of the diverse movements that sustain open 
technoscience is not that they challenge technoscience as such but that they try to 
create alternative knowledge practices inside different fields of technoscience. 
This distinction is of importance: it implies that a politics of publics can no 
longer be socially and materially transformative. What instigates transformation 
is the socially distributed and more than human experimentation with 
technoscience to create alternative forms of life. 
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 Publics vs science? 
Examining the relation between science and its publics, a relation often 
characterised by mistrust, if not antagonism, usually presupposes a separation 
between the two as distinct entities. But to what extent is this the case and how 
did we arrive to believe that such a separation is empirically justifiable and 
conceptually possible? 
In their paper on imaginaries of publics in the UK, Welsh and Wynne 
(2013) investigate how the state encounters the publics of science in the post-
WWII period, a period marked by the ascent of science as an institution that 
produces authoritative knowledge which then comes to inform and shape state 
policies. They claim that state perception of publics changed from initially (1950-
1980) conceiving the public as a passive and scientifically illiterate recipient of 
advanced knowledge, to understanding the public as a threat to science and 
innovation-led growth (1990s), to finally moving to suppress publics that protest 
against specific technologies (2000s). These latter developments unfold in parallel 
to attempts of the state to create channels of communication and exchange 
between science and publics by facilitating deliberative and participatory 
inclusion of citizens in forming the agendas and research orientation of research, 
most notably captured by the public understanding of science initiatives in the 
1980s and 1990s and the increased attempts to engage publics since then.  
There are several examples that would support this trifold typification of 
the relation between publics, science and the state including the ones discussed in 
Welsh and Wynne’s paper: anti-nuclear movements, anti-GMO mobilisations and 
climate change campaigns. Likewise many texts in McNeil and Haran’s (2013) 
special issue in which Welsh and Wynne’s paper also appeared. Haran (2013), for 
example, shows how publics that opposed the legislation on the creation of 
hybrid embryos in the UK in 2007-08 were framed as irrational and their position 
was effectively delegitimised (see also Reynolds, 2013 for a discussion of the 'GM 
Nation' public engagement excercise). 
All these examples seem to represent the public as a potentially 
contentious force that science tries to contain and/or keep outside its core 
institutions. In particular, Welsh and Wynne bring together a wealth of sources 
from social movement studies in order to discuss this agonistic relation between 
science and publics which to a large extent is facilitated by state institutions. 
What characterises this relation is a reciprocal externality between science and 
publics. Yet, even if we accept for a moment that this has been the case 
historically, to what extent is it still the case today? Are science and publics 
generally separate? 
 
The implosion of publics and technoscience 
One could argue that these examples feature prominently because something 
very different is happening: publics and science implode into each other. The 
barriers between the publics and science collapse creating a space of 
continuous and multifarious exchanges and conflicts. Rather than one clear-cut 
 conflict between science and publics that Welsh and Wynne assume, there is a 
multiplicity of exchanges and conflicts that emerge as the separation between 
publics and science collapses. In these conditions the relation between science 
and society, knowledge and politics, materiality and culture become much more 
difficult to disentangle. There is no longer an obvious way to confront the 
purported authority of science. The loss of a clear target of critique is in ways 
disorienting but there are reasons for excitement too. This collapse opens 
different political possibilities beyond the modernist/humanist redemption 
story of a potential enlightened public against authoritarian science and its re-
alignment with a possible democratic science. 
When the barriers between science and publics collapse, science is practised 
in multiple ways and not only in some of its core institutions (McNeil, 2013). Also its 
actors multiply and the traffic between different players increases. The fusion of 
science and publics is contained through the securitisation of science--
something to which Welsh and Wynne allude when they describe how publics 
are silenced today. But it is important to note here that this securitisation is not 
primarily a top-down process organised by the state. Rather, securitisation is 
diffused in and performed by science itself. 
The threat is not outside science (that is the publics) but inside science 
itself (that is specific configurations of science and publics). The more science 
becomes open, the more securitised it becomes: (1) the instalment of physical 
infrastructures and complex architectures of entry requirements that regulate 
physical, technical and informational access; (2) the proliferation of socio-legal 
measures (formal and informal rights, patents, contracts, entitlements, codes, 
dispositions etc.) that define degrees of scientific legitimacy and power. 
Securitisation means that the amalgamation of science and publics is not 
controlled from above (by some state institutions) but on the level of the 
everyday. 
This condition is what characterises technoscience (Haraway, 1997, Ihde 
and Selinger, 2003, Weber, 2010). The fusion of technology, science and 
everyday life is not just another name for science; this fusion refers to 
something much wider that the acknowledgment that technology actively 
shapes basic research and that basic research is increasingly concerned with 
impact on applications and the everyday. Translation and technological 
interoperability in technoscience is a constitutive moment of knowledge 
production linking directly technological innovation to basic research. 
However, beyond the centrality of translation between technology and 
science, technoscience also means that the actors assembled in the making of 
knowledge are not arranged according to the traditional gap between science and 
publics. Every specific knowledge practice assembles around it a different social 
and material world--be it scientists, technologists, animals, materials, businesses, 
social policy makers, tools, practitioners, consumers, enthusiasts, activists, 
finance, community stakeholders etc. In technoscience publics are always 
traversing knowledge. In technoscience publics are always traversing knowledge. 
 But here, of course, publics are not an abstraction but always specific 
publics: concrete and varied groups of publics contribute to create a ‘region of 
objectivity’ that defines what counts as credible knowledge and how a specific 
scientific topic is discussed (Papadopoulos, 2011). In fact, the public is an empty 
category: when invoked as such, it creates the impression that there is an entity 
operating outside technoscience and that science can be developed outside of its 
publics. Rather, different parts of publics and technoscience merge into each 
other to create the uneven, often contentious spaces in which knowledge is 
produced. 
 
Distributed invention power 
But if this is the case, then what constitutes the specificity of scientific 
knowledge? Speaking of science as technoscience sounds like outright social 
constructivism. It isn’t. Technoscience does not tell the story of the social 
construction of facts but a story of a different way of constructing and creating 
knowledge altogether. The creation of scientific facts is not shaped by how 
different publics contribute to their making along the way. Rather, the creation 
of facts is stabilised as a region of objectivity. In each specific moment this 
distributed creation of facts is stabilised as a region of objectivity, that is as an 
arrangement in which for a certain period of time technoscientific facts are 
considered as stable and widely accepted. That is, various players co-establish 
spaces where specific ways of thinking and acting are widely accepted as matters 
of fact for a certain period of time (Papadopoulos, 2011: 179). 
How is this stabilisation achieved? Do the involved publics make ‘facts’ 
appear as facts? Or are facts the outcome of a specific scientific practice, ‘the 
experimental achievement’ (Stengers (2000)? This key event characterises for 
Stengers modern science, when only what has passed through thorough 
experimental testing, and most importantly has withstood it, becomes a 
scientific fact. From this perspective, science is a very specific type of 
practice that enables scientists to challenge their own questions and 
assumptions in order to achieve a level of certainty: only the questions that 
have withstood their objections can be considered scientific. 
In other worlds, scientific knowledge is a distinct practice that doesn’t 
come from the co-action of a multiplicity of actors (that is fragments of publics, 
scientists and non-human others) but from this very specific single event of the 
experimental achievement. But is this the case in cognitive science, climate 
science, biosciences, soil science, neuroscience, informatics, biomedicine, 
geosciences--to name a few examples? In all these scientific fields the 
experimental achievement is mediated by many different trajectories and actors 
already before it has taken place, even before it has been formulated. We cannot 
say that this is the case – unless we neglect the invisible and indeed invisibilised 
labours of so many different human, animal and 
inorganic actors that contribute to making facts (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011). 
In technoscience what counts as creation is not primarily the individual 
 experimental achievement that gives coherence to scientific practice (although 
this might be sometimes part of it); rather, it is a form of dispersed 
experimentation: distributed invention power. Science in technoscience is not done 
by those who object but rather by those who invent in intended and 
unintended collaborations. Science 
in technoscience is intersubjectively ‘materialized action’ (Schraube, 2009). Consider 
the making of a chimerical mice, a transgenic lab animal, of the robot Atlas, of 
earth observation patterns of soil erosion, the visualisation of neural networks, 
climate simulations, synthetic molecules etc. 
 
More than human technoscience 
By contrast to any other form of labour power, invention power is 
specifically bound to the constraints set up in a concrete region of objectivity, 
that is the ecology where a specific type of knowledge is produced. And as such 
invention power is never a singular achievement but an act of connection--not 
any connection though, but a connection that makes a difference in a region of 
objectivity. In fact, invention power is hardly ever an individual act or even an 
act in itself but a synergy of practices that allow for a type of knowledge to 
emerge that alters a region of objectivity. It could be said that this synergy 
assembles different publics in it. 
But distributed invention power is indifferent to the separation between 
publics and science. Not because the production of scientific knowledge is 
unspecific or can be done by anybody, anywhere, anytime – but rather because it 
cannot be done without gathering a very specific set of actors, resources and spaces 
around it that allow it to emerge; such actors that often are more than human. 
With John Hartigan (2015b, p. 5) we need to ask: 'If publics are decidedly 
human--self-reflexive readers, hailed by various nationally mediated cultural 
form--than how do we account for the presence of so many highlighted 
arrangements of multispecies life in their midst?'. 
If science as experimental achievement ever existed, this achievement is 
dispersed in society and matter -- in a ‘more than one world’, in a ‘more than 
human world’, to use de la Cadena’s (2010) words. Technoscience is more 
than human: the fleshly and material mixture of different fragments of 
publics, scientists, stakeholders with inorganic substances and other plant 
and animal actors. Not only are publics dispersed in technoscience and cease 
to be the primary actor (along with scientists) in a region of objectivity but 
also their significance does not stem from their capacity to act as publics; 
rather, these dispersed publics exist as such because of their ability to co-act 
with other non-human actors that populate each region of objectivity. 
Rather than instances of 'nature' that withstand the thorough testing of 
scientists, technoscientific entities demand from us to think of knowledge 
production as a force of co-making. Invention power requires ecological 
transversality -- the transfer of substances, processes and practices across 
disparate material registers and human or non-human communities of life 
 (Papadopoulos, 2014a). 
'Species thinking' (Chakrabarty, 2009, p. 213) deeply upsets any notion 
that invention power relies on humans. In fact human activity and relationality 
more broadly cannot exist outside of practices of interspecies engagement--be it 
interspecies care, labour or even exploitation and destruction, as for example 
Hartigan (2015a), Pandian (2009), Schrader (2010) or van Dooren (2014) show in 
their work. In analysing Darwin's experiments Hustak and Myers (2013, p. 106) 
conclude that '[I]t is in encounters between orchids, insects, and scientists that we 
find openings for an ecology of interspecies intimacies and subtle propositions. 
What is at stake in this involutionary approach is a theory of ecological 
relationality that takes seriously organisms as inventive practitioners who 
experiment as they craft interspecies lives and worlds.' 
And it is not only the creative involvement of other species that 
destabilises any fixed notion of publics but also that the co-action between 
different species, inorganic substances and artefacts equally break and reorganise 
any notion of publics vis-à-vis science (Marres and Lezaun, 2011). This is 
something that, for example, Tim Choy's (2011) work on environmental politics 
in Hong Kong shows well as he describes how a diverse array of environmental 
actors can be thought less as constitutive of a clearly organised public sphere 
and more of an ecology or, even, a regional biotic community. 
 
Experimental labour: Ethopoiesis 
The construction of knowledge in technoscience is neither social, nor radical, 
nor construction tout court; it is a practice of making through distributed, more 
than human invention power which reveals a different architecture of the 
conditions of knowledge production. Let’s talk about work. Let’s talk with 
Leigh Star (Star, 1991, see also Clarke, 2014, Papadopoulos, 2014b, Puig de la 
Bellacasa, 2014) about all these labours that have been rendered absent and 
invisible in the experimental achievement and in the humanist tale of making 
and contesting scientific facts. What kind of labours are necessary in order for 
knowledge to be produced? What is this form of labour that is distributed 
invention power and who holds it? 
In his illuminating study on the making of transgenic rice in experimental 
fields in the Philippines Chris Kortright (2013) introduces the term experimental 
labour to describe how research work is always embodied and haptic, operating 
in the constraints of the time and space in which the experiment takes place, 
involving a complex interaction with other local actors and the environment. 
Experimental labour is about invention and invention is always situated. In the 
contemporary mode of production invention power is the valorisation of social, 
cognitive, affective and relational activities that are embodied and situated in 
one's own life (originally see Moulier Boutang, 2012, p. 93, Negri, 2005, p. 268). 
Experimental labour is creative and inventive because it implies an involvement 
in the lives of other living and non-living beings. It is this ‘ethopoietical practice’ 
(Puig de la Bellacasa, 2010), the simultaneous production of ethos and ontology 
 that cultivates distributed invention power. Experimental labour fuses into 
experience subjectivity and materiality (Schraube, 2013). 
There are more publics involved in technoscience than one would 
imagine at first sight. If one sees the work of technoscience as experimental 
labour then one cannot avoid seeing how many different types of relations, social 
groups, species, ecologies, interdependencies and ways of life participate in the 
making of knowledge. The opposition between science and its publics mystifies 
technoscience by closing it down to some few of its processes, players and 
outcomes. Instead we need to ask the question, how wide and intense is the 
technoscientific field we are investigating. The smaller it appears to be, that is the 
less participants and intensive exchanges it contains, the more likely it is that we 
use science as a proxy for something else: political authority, social power, 
democratic deficit, economic wealth, symbolic capital etc. But if we read 
technoscience as something that is done through meticulous, embodied and 
distributed experimentation then we start seeing how different publics and other 
actors with different capacities are always participating in the making of science. 
 
Experimental labour: The blackmail of precarity 
Following Kortright’s (2013) work, thus far I have discussed the experimental aspect 
of experimental labour. But what about the aspect of labour? Invention power 
embedded in the current structures of technoscientific production is a highly 
segmented activity. The conditions of experimental labour are distributed 
unequally. Producers of knowledge are differentially positioned towards their 
own labour as well as the outcomes of their labour: there are different classes of 
researchers, scientists, experimental workers (as there are in fact different classes 
of lab animals, plants and materials that are valued and exploited differently). 
Consider the increased measurements of research activity, the making of 
different levels of researchers with only few of them being in secure positions, 
the precarisation of research work, the multiplication of different tiers of 
academic and independent research institutions, the access to research funding 
which increasingly becomes available only to few, the rise of the post-doc 
worker, the lab as the post-Fordist knowledge factory, the exploitation of the 
invention power of young researchers by senior scientists, the zero hours 
lecturers. All these tendencies show that technoscience’s experimental labour is 
highly diversified and under the constant blackmail of precarisation (for different 
approaches and theorisations of this conflict see Edu-factory Collective, 2009, 
Berardi, 2010, Morini and Fumagalli, 2010, Murgia and Armano, 2012a, Murgia 
and Armano, 2012b, Papadopoulos et al., 2008, Muller and Kenney, forthc.). 
To uphold the dichotomy between science and publics, one needs to ask: 
Is the contract-dependent lab researcher or the precarious academic closer to 
‘science’ or its ‘publics’? And who is the potential threat here? Is it the publics? 
The answer is no because there is no such thing as the publics in this 
configuration. Rather, there are scientific publics, that is certain segments of 
scientists themselves. Technoscience is not the outcome of the activity of one 
 single subject, the ‘scientist’: many different classes of experimental workers 
participate in it and these are in fact all different groups of publics. This creates 
many conflicts that could erupt anytime and, indeed, erupt in different ways 
between different segments of scientists. 
Securitisation comes to control this situation on the ground of day to 
day research activity and academic work. Who has access to which type of 
academic positions? What is the value of our research? Who gets which type of 
contracts and why? Securitisation brings with it mundane technologies of 
control: Many researchers, scientists, academic workers live under the threat of 
precarisation. That’s how the boundaries of technoscience are policed -- not 
because they exist de facto, but rather because the boundaries are erected 
depending on the specific conditions and conflicts in each specific region of 
objectivity. The securitisation of research work performs the selection of 
research agendas by permitting or deterring research activity on a specific topic 
in a region of objectivity. Publics are already embedded in the very heart of 
technoscience; they are excluded, exploited and suppressed in multiple ways. 
 
Biofinancialisation 
This complex architecture of inclusion and simultaneous exclusion is 
sustained through the pervasive securitisation of technoscience. I use here 
Kath Weston’s (2013) term biosecuritisation--the securitisation of life-- to 
describe this complex architecture of control in technoscience. The term 
designates a double move in which science is both securitised in terms of 
surveillance and policing of the actors that operate in it (as discussed in 
previous sections) as well as securitised in terms of the financialisation of 
its underlying socio-material configuration. It is this latter aspect that I 
want to turn to now. 
Financialisation is more than the reliance on fictitious financial capital; 
more than that, it is the reliance on a prevalent culture of valuation that attempts 
to reduce different forms and scales of valuation into one scale of measurement: 
financial valuations (Lilley and Papadopoulos, 2014). We used the term 
biofinancialisation to designate the insertion of this indeterminate process of 
valuation into everyday life, materiality, and the environment -- including the 
present and, most crucially, future appreciation of assets, goods, services, 
intangibles, the health and subjective capacities of individuals, the physical 
environment, human artefacts, other species, urban space and, also, knowledge. 
What is the financial value of a novel compound? What is the financial 
value of an equation? What is the financial value of our academic work? What is 
the financial value of a scientific paper? What is the financial value of animal 
tissue? What is the financial value of a simulation of a neural network? What is 
the financial value of soil? What is the financial value of an oil spill and what of 
the dying birds? 
There are many different ways to approach the valuation of these and similar 
objects and living entities (see for example Beckert and Aspers, 2011, French and 
 Kneale, 2012, Huguenin et al., 2006, Robertson, 2006, Beverungen et al., 2013, 
Karpik, 2010, Moeran and Pedersen, 2011, Stark, 2009, Zelizer, 1979). However, 
what is important for the purpose of this paper is that the biofinancialised regime 
of production relies on the appropriation of broader aspects of social and material 
life, everyday activities, resources of cooperation, transmaterial and interspecies 
relations. The biosecuritisation of technoscience reorders our understanding of 
who controls what in each specific field of technoscience. Welsh and Wynne locate 
the control (and suppression) of publics in the operations of state institutions. 
But through biosecuritisation the locus of control cannot be easily 
located within the state or some prominent core scientific institutions. 
Biosecuritisation implicates many different actors--private and public, state 
owned or those belonging to the commons--at the same time and shifts the locus 
of control constantly according to the necessities of each specific situation in a 
region of objectivity. Biosecuritisation perceives as a threat every attempt to exit 
an arrangement that translates our activities to some form of financial value. 
Even the commons (practises of communing, common pool resources, peer 
production and common forms of sociality and relationality that are neither 
public nor private) that traditionally were outside the biofinancial system of value 
production enter gradually into it: biofinancial accumulation not only 
appropriates and mixes res publicae (public sphere) and res privatae (private sector), 
it also relies on the expropriation of res communes. 
 
Methodological techno-nationalism 
It is not only that private and public actors in different configurations participate 
in the production of knowledge but that technoscience needs to capture the 
creativity and potentials that exist in the commons. What is the difference 
between the commons and the publics here? The publics are always to some 
form or another linked to the state either as civil society operating in the 
symbolic and territorial realm of the state or as social groups which are activated 
by certain governmental institutions or as pressure groups that articulate their 
demands towards the state (or many times as threats as Welsh and Wynne discuss 
in their paper). That publics always map to the state does not mean that the 
public is identical to a specific segment of the state (let’s say its population) but 
that the public always expresses itself and in fact exists only through channels 
that are set up by the state and support its governance. One could go as far as to 
say that publics are proactively constructed by state institutions. This does not 
diminish the creativity of the publics but it reveals the limits of their role. As 
Lezaun and Soneryd (2007) say: ‘Technologies of [public] elicitation, and the 
cohorts of experts that control their application and interpret their results, 
constitute, a veritable extractive industry, one that seeks to engage publics in 
dialogue and generate certified “public opinion” with the ultimate goal of 
increasing the productivity of government’. 
Even if publics might sometimes organise transnationally they only 
become visible, in fact they become publics, as long as they get involved in 
 processes of state governance (either through their engagement and participation 
in formal institutions or because of their exclusion and delegitimisation from 
them). There is no publics without state institutions even if publics are viewed as 
a threat by the state and are in fact often treated as a threat. The concept of 
public suffers from methodological nationalism which does not of course reduce 
its importance. It highlights though its inherent limitations. 
And here is where the notion of commons contributes to understanding 
technoscience with a conceptualisation of certain forms of organisation that 
operate differently than the interlaced private-public spaces. The commons exist 
and can sustain themselves without the direct involvement of state institutions. 
That is why the commons is not publics. But that doesn’t mean that the 
commons are not implicated and involved in technoscience and its securitisation. 
Although politically much more radical in its functions than the publics, the 
commons is not independent and autonomous of the structures of 
technoscientific knowledge production. Hayden (2010) has forcefully 
interrogated the discourse of the commons as a clear counterpart to the enclosed 
regimes of intellectual property and has shown how the logic of the commons is 
intimately entwined with enclosed private and state sectors. 
 
The fold 
In technoscience there is no clear split between science and publics, between 
private and public, between publics and commons and so on. These actors are 
all very different--occasionally they are against each other--but to one extent or 
another they are all involved in the making of technoscience. I argued earlier for 
dropping the idea that publics are outside of science and the state. 
Here I add another one reason to do so: technoscience exists only as the 
private sector, the public sphere and the commons fold into each other. 
Invisible structures of common exchange and cooperation, organised public 
institutions and civil society actors as well as private interests and funding 
circulate through technoscience and reinforce each other. ‘Give me a laboratory 
and I will raise the world.’ But this captures only one aspect of technoscience. 
Let’s capture technoscience in action: Give me a laboratory and I will raise a 
start-up. Give me a laboratory and I will raise a social centre. Give me venture 
capital and I will raise a laboratory. Give me state funding and I will raise a 
laboratory. Give me a social mobilisation and I will raise a laboratory. And so 
on. 
This constant folding creates a new situation were science can no longer 
be considered as unified nor is it given which form of practise is defining the 
workings of technoscience. Increased public engagement can no longer be 
considered a secure path towards the democratisation of science, as for example 
Jenny Reardon (2012) shows in her work. Neither does the inclusion of 
scientific experts in regulatory procedures necessarily ensure 'regulatory 
pluralism, reflexivity on the science-law relationship or democratic 
accountability' (Bonneuil and Levidow, 2012, p. 97). Public engagement can be 
 seen as a mere productive activity in post-Fordist economies (Thorpe and 
Gregory, 2010). Kate O'Riordan (2013) for example shows how public 
involvement in direct-to-consumer genetic providers constructs the publics as 
consumers who then shape the genetic information provided. 
When one actor becomes a threat capable of destabilising a region of 
objectivity, only in exceptional cases is the solution suppression (as implied in 
Welsh and Wynne, 2013). Threats to the stability of a technoscientific field are 
usually not suppressed; rather, they are controlled as they fold into one of the 
other entities and are appropriated by it. For example, when movements of the 
commons challenge a specific technoscientific field and are perceived as a threat 
then a usual response is to either expropriate the commons into the private 
sector or formalise and channel their creativity in some form of publics. 
This continuous folding of the private, the public and the commons into 
each other creates a condition where designating one of these three domains as 
the primary force behind technoscientific innovation becomes almost impossible. 
Is it big science (Shapin, 2008), the commodification of science (Dumit, 2012), 
the neoliberal privatisation of science (Mirowski, 2011), the economisation of 
science (Berman, 2013), the privatisation of public institutions (Newfield, 2008) 
that drives technoscientific knowledge production? Or is it the intervention of 
the public though processes of deliberation and contention (Davies, 2006)? Or is 
it perhaps the practices of the commons that sustain and feed technoscientific 
innovation (Kelty, 2008)? 
It is difficult to define a single sphere that drives technoscience. For 
better or worse, there is no single determination of technoscientific knowledge 
and there is no privileged location in which technoscience takes place. Neither is 
there a privileged position for controlling technoscience. 
 
Contesting Technoscience 
In these conditions it is less clear who can contest technoscience and from which 
perspective than it is often presented when we use the idea of the publics. There 
are of course some iconic mobilisations that can easily reproduce the vision that 
science and its publics are external to each other and are deeply oppositional 
such as the cases discussed by Welsh and Wynne. The anti-nuclear movement, 
the GM debate and climate justice mobilisations. 
But to what extent do these movements contest science as such? Or in 
other words, do these movements target only science as such or more broadly 
different entities and institutions that are involved in each one of these specific 
fields, such as the specific industries, specific state institutions, politicians, 
popular opinion itself, media, local stakeholders, scientists, policy makers etc? 
The latter is the case. Social movements in technoscience rarely contest only 
science; rather, they contest the aggregate environment of a region of objectivity 
in which a specific technoscientific development takes place. 
This distinction changes fundamentally what social movements are and 
how they operate in technoscience. Social movements form around a set of 
 political issues and material realities that entail technoscientific knowledge and 
only by doing this they address technoscientific knowledge per se. Moreover, 
they organise not only in order to contest specific knowledge per se but in order 
to challenge social and material injustices that pertain to their concerns. Welsh 
and Wynne show this very clearly and make also an important theoretical point 
here when they poignantly say that ‘the conventional idea that unmobilised 
ordinary citizens as publics are different from mobilised social movement 
network publics is mistaken. Publics mobilised as social movements are not only 
interwoven and continuous with what are often called “silent majority” neutral 
publics, but, we contend, they are articulating the normative public concerns 
which are often shared silently, well beyond their own network populations 
themselves’ (2013, p. 542). 
This is important because it changes our understanding of how social 
movements form and operate--Chesters and Welsh (2006) have written 
eloquently about this, see also Papadopoulos et al. (2008): They contest power 
not only by organising protest but by creating the conditions for the articulation 
of alternative imaginaries and alternative practices that bypass instituted power 
and generate alternative modes of existence. Protest and resistance social 
movements that channel all their actions to resistance are vocal and visible. 
But they are not the main force in social movements' action. What 
defines at the end social movement action is the capacity to set-up alternative 
forms of everyday existence and mundane practices that come to force power 
in a specific field to reorganise itself and to reengage the actors involved in 
new ways. Karfakis (2013) has for example discussed how the multiplicity of 
mobilisations of people diagnosed with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome target 
simultaneously popular opinion, social policy, workplace exclusion and specific 
technoscientific knowledge. Murphy (2012) has shown how the politicisation 
of technoscientific aspects of reproductive health has created a complex 
entanglement of women's empowerment with the broader economic, social 
and political logics of the past fifty years. I have discussed AIDS treatment 
activism as a movement that instigated major social and material 
transformations beyond the teleological view that it solely focussed on 
contesting scientific expertise (Papadopoulos, 2011). 
 
From protest to open technoscience 
Many of the different approaches to social movements in the sciences up to the 
2000s were gravitating around protest and resistance, and ultimately cultivated 
the imaginary of a possible inclusion of the publics in science (Epstein, 2007). I 
Inclusion seemed to be the horizon of action: inclusion in the hermetic 
cathedrals of science with the aim to shape research agendas upstream and 
change state policies. Consider the history of protest movements: the science for 
the people mobilisations of the 1960s and 1970s, the radicalisation of green, 
ecological and health movements in the 1980s, the demands for participation in 
science policy as well as in defining the topics of research in the 1990s, etc. Each 
 movement demanded the insertion of publics into scientific institutions and 
political decision mechanisms. 
But when science co-evolves with the actions of so many different 
publics, when in fact technoscience cannot exist without them, such 
movements have little effect. The demand for inclusion does not make sense 
because they are already inside! Exclusion is organised through the inclusion of 
actors in different positions and capacities. Simultaneously, this implosion of 
technoscience and publics and of inclusion and exclusion promotes a different 
imaginary which is less about contesting technoscience and more about the 
alternative making of science. 
Instead directing demands for change to science, the practice of making 
science has created an alternative vision of technoscience. Technoscience can 
be imagined as open. Open science is a contested terrain not a given reality or a 
definite programme. Depending on the specific subfield and topic the quest for 
openness addresses different issues and different levels on which technoscience 
is operating: (1) open research agendas; (2) open standards; (3) open hardware; 
(4) open data repositories; (5) open access to research outputs. Not all of these 
take place necessarily and simultaneously in every subfield but technoscience is 
challenged from inside by combinations of these alternative practices. 
Big enclosed technoscience and open science often co-exist in certain 
fields or even more they feed each other, often making impossible to see how a 
technoscientific field can continue developing without all these different levels 
of organisation. Of course, this is far from a peaceful co-existence; it is a matter 
of appropriation and conflict. Big science and proprietary science constantly 
expropriate and privatise or enclose open science. Simultaneously, open science 
exists by reclaiming knowledge and technologies that are developed in the realm 
of enclosed science. Although implicitly reproducing the false dichotomy 
between publics and science Adrian Mackenzie (2013) in his work on open 
biology offers a glimpse into this ambivalent movement between 'publics' that 
object and invent on the one hand, and 'publics' that are just validating and 
confirming big Bio on the other. Alessandro Delfanti (2011) offers a more 
complex view of this process in which the folding of private enterprises, publics 
and the commons into each other underlies the constant, often antagonistic, 
oscillation between big enclosed science and open science (see also Hope, 
2008). 
But one could object here: is this enough to contest and challenge 
technoscience in its present form? Is open technoscience strong enough to 
bypass the pervasiveness of technoscience? Traditional protest movements – 
such as those described in Welsh and Wynne’s paper and many of the papers 
included in McNeil and Haran’s (2013) special issue – seem to conceive 
technoscience as an already formed, unified and given terrain. Open science 
reverses this approach. Social movements are successful to the extent that they 
change the conditions of knowledge production by engaging with knowledge 
production in a specific subfield of technoscience. However, as long as these 
 movements remain only protest and resistance movements their capacity to 
instigate social and material transformations is limited. Only when social 
movements produce alternative knowledge with, within and occasionally against 
specific developments in technoscience can effectively challenge the constituted 
order of a technoscientific region of objectivity and become constituent forces of 
technoscientific change (Papadopoulos, 2011). 
 
Give me a kitchen and I will raise a world. From open technoscience 
to alter- ontologies 
How far can social movements for open technoscience carry us? The limit of 
open technoscience is that the more successful it becomes the less political it 
will be. We know this already from the open software movement. The 
designations ‘open’ and ‘free’ software account for a small difference but of 
crucial importance. Free and open software are not very different in terms of 
how they are made and their intrinsic qualities; but free software is made 
explicitly as an attempt to promote the value of non-proprietary software, that is 
to promote justice by challenging copyright, while open software is promoting 
the software itself as an infrastructural tool for facilitating open information 
access (Stallman, 2013, Coleman and Golub, 2008). 
We already know today that this difference, although so crucial for the 
development of open software, has been almost lost. The reason is that open and 
free software outpaced itself in terms of the innovation it produced and is now in 
the process of being continuously folded into proprietary software and vice versa. 
In this sense there is no longer open source software as fully separate from 
proprietary software since both feed into each other in order to exist; and, there 
is no free software as distinct from open and proprietary software because it is 
simply contributing to the making of the same infrastructures of codes despite 
the political differences and values that motivate it. As Kelty (2013, p. 3) puts it, 
‘There is no free software. And the problem it solved is yet with us.’ 
But one has to ask here: Why do we expect social movements to solve 
social problems or at least to contribute to their solutions? Academic research 
on social movements seem to be stubbornly functionalist. But it is time to 
overcome this teleological understanding of social movements as always fixed 
on a certain task or having a certain target. Social movements are good if they 
seek specific solutions otherwise they are subconsciously perceived as too 
unruly, unclassifiable, interstitial, hybrid, dangerous. Functionalism in the 
understanding of social movements ends up reproducing the logic of the state 
that treats them ultimately as a threat as long as they are not incorporated into 
it. But if social movements are more about creating worlds beyond the one 
world of the state and its publics, then the question of how far can open 
technoscience carry or include us becomes less important. 
Movements of open technoscience create new spaces for alternative 
social and ecological action and for material experimentation. From kitchen 
science to DIY biology, the maker movement, the alternative experimentation 
 with medical substances, lay engineering projects, production of alternative forms 
of energy, projects of ecological modernization from below, self-managed 
systems against environmental hazards, alternative forms of agriculture and soil 
renewal, radical patient-based campaigns, permaculture regeneration, punk 
science, health movements, indigenous eco-cosmologies, clandestine chemistry, 
the hackers culture, ecological justice initiatives, cross-species collaborations, bio-
art, self-organised projects of scientific literacy--all examples of reclaiming and 
reinventing technoscience from within (for an analysis of some of these projects 
see the innovative work of Ghelfi, forthc.). Give me a hackerspace and I will raise 
a laboratory. Give me a community space and I will raise a laboratory. Given me 
a garage laboratory and I will raise a world. Given me a laboratory and I will raise 
a world. Give me a kitchen and I will raise a world. 
What is constitutive of these movements, practices and initiatives is not 
that they encounter and target technoscience as such but that they change the 
conditions of knowledge production inside different fields of technoscience. 
This distinction is of importance: it implies that a politics of publics challenging 
technoscience as such can no longer be socially and materially transformative. 
What initiates transformation is the socially distributed and more than human 
experimentation with technoscience to create alter-ontologies, i.e. alternative 
knowledge and new forms of life. 
What is at stake here is not technoscience itself but life in its ontological 
constitution. And these social movements target exactly this: the alternative 
creation of ontologies, the forking of life into alternative forms of existence--
alter-ontologies. They change technoscience not by (primarily) targeting 
technoscience itself but by attempting to change life entangled with 
technoscience. Can technoscience ever become fully open? Can these 
movements ever liberate technoscience? Possibly not but this is not the point. 
What matters is that in this process technoscience itself becomes a field of social 
and interspecies experimentation. The more intensive this process is, the more 
publics become experimenters, commoners, practitioners of technoscience and 
of the alternative worlds they craft. 
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